German Mountain Warfare
See also Mountaineering and Historic Archives/Original Film
This is the now unclassifed 1944 War Department's analysis of the German Gebirgsjäger divisions which was provided to U.S. Army commanders down to the regimental level, in anticipation of their expected encounters with mountain troops during operations in Italy and eventually in Bavaria.
Included in the War Deparment's analysis is an extensive excerpt, translated into English, from the German manual of 1935 entitled, "Provisional Training Instructions for Mountain Troops." Essentially, that is the manual that provided mountain soldiers of all ranks with their doctrine of mountain warfare translated into specific standard operating procedures. From "German Mountain Warfare" are drawn two summarized, easy to digest slide presentations, "Alpine Combat" and "Mountaineering", available below for download.
This is the now unclassifed 1944 War Department's analysis of the German Gebirgsjäger divisions which was provided to U.S. Army commanders down to the regimental level, in anticipation of their expected encounters with mountain troops during operations in Italy and eventually in Bavaria.
Included in the War Deparment's analysis is an extensive excerpt, translated into English, from the German manual of 1935 entitled, "Provisional Training Instructions for Mountain Troops." Essentially, that is the manual that provided mountain soldiers of all ranks with their doctrine of mountain warfare translated into specific standard operating procedures. From "German Mountain Warfare" are drawn two summarized, easy to digest slide presentations, "Alpine Combat" and "Mountaineering", available below for download.
| german-mountain-warfare.pdf |
| alpine_combat.pdf |
| mountaineering_ppt.pdf |
| mountain_division_org_chart.pdf |
The analysis is divided into the following sections:
I. German Doctrine of Mountain Warfare
II. Training
III. Army Mountain Guides
IV. Clothing, Identification, Individual Equipment
V. Organization, Armament, Equipment
Appendix: Firing in Mountains
Illustrations: There are 40 illustrations provided by the U.S. Army
From the Introduction:
"The Germans believe that specially trained mountain troops may influence decisively the outcome of a campaign, for mass armies must rely on specially trained small forces to secure their advance through the broader mountain valleys in order to reach "the flat", where the decision is usually sought.
Small forces of mountain troops can prevent, impede, harass or channel the movements of the main enemy force through the valleys, so that when the decisive battle takes place in the flat, the enemy's power is spent and he is compelled to fight under the most unfavorable conditions.
When on the offensive, mountain troops can cover and protect the advance of their own main force, enabling it to reach terrain of its own choice in the highest state of readiness for combat.
Thus their mission on the offensive is to secure the route for the advance of large units through the valleys, whereas their mission on the defensive is to deny the valleys to the mass of enemy forces. In either case, mountain troops must gain control of the mountains.
In mountains, the infantry-artillery team retains the ascendancy which other fields of battle it yields in part to armor and air power. However the employment of heavy weapons is hampered by their bulk and weight and the difficulties of observation due to weather and intervening terrain features. Thus it is the infantry, above all, that must bear the brunt of the battle. The importance of shock action increases as the efficiency of other methods decreases, and in some respects mountain fighting resembles guerrilla warfare.
Because of the narrow terrain compartments, unified control is possible only over small units and in very rugged terrain the task unit must be even smaller. Therefore greater responsibility is place on leaders of lower rank.
The focal points of mountain combat are the heights. Gun emplacements and observation posts on commanding heights dominate foreground and valley, making the task of the advancing force on the flat easier. But of all mountain operations, the seizure of heights is most difficult. A well-defended height must be taken by surprise to avoid great losses.
Basic characteristics of mountain warfare stressed in training:
1) Movement is much slower than in the flat. Deployment requires more time. The attack proceeds slowly. The large number of good defensive positions and scarcity of roads facilitate delaying actions. Reserves have to be held very close to the front lines to prevent unforseen terrain and weather conditions from delaying their arrival at a crucial phase of battle.
2) Command and control must stay close to the decisive point. Signal communication is less reliable than in the flat. Control of the battle by the higher commander is limited largely to a pre-conceived and thorough plan, since the poor reliability of communication usually prevents him from intervening effectively once the battle has begun. Consequently the responsibility of subordinate commanders for independent action is greater than in the flat. Rarely can they expect aid from reserves.
3) The problem of supply becomes extremely acute. Motor transport must be used as far as possible into the heights, then carried on mules and mountain horses, and finally on the backs of the soldiers. Economy of supplies is necessary because the danger of extending a unit beyond its supply column is great and an over-extended unit cannot live off the country in the mountains."
I. German Doctrine of Mountain Warfare
II. Training
III. Army Mountain Guides
IV. Clothing, Identification, Individual Equipment
V. Organization, Armament, Equipment
Appendix: Firing in Mountains
Illustrations: There are 40 illustrations provided by the U.S. Army
From the Introduction:
"The Germans believe that specially trained mountain troops may influence decisively the outcome of a campaign, for mass armies must rely on specially trained small forces to secure their advance through the broader mountain valleys in order to reach "the flat", where the decision is usually sought.
Small forces of mountain troops can prevent, impede, harass or channel the movements of the main enemy force through the valleys, so that when the decisive battle takes place in the flat, the enemy's power is spent and he is compelled to fight under the most unfavorable conditions.
When on the offensive, mountain troops can cover and protect the advance of their own main force, enabling it to reach terrain of its own choice in the highest state of readiness for combat.
Thus their mission on the offensive is to secure the route for the advance of large units through the valleys, whereas their mission on the defensive is to deny the valleys to the mass of enemy forces. In either case, mountain troops must gain control of the mountains.
In mountains, the infantry-artillery team retains the ascendancy which other fields of battle it yields in part to armor and air power. However the employment of heavy weapons is hampered by their bulk and weight and the difficulties of observation due to weather and intervening terrain features. Thus it is the infantry, above all, that must bear the brunt of the battle. The importance of shock action increases as the efficiency of other methods decreases, and in some respects mountain fighting resembles guerrilla warfare.
Because of the narrow terrain compartments, unified control is possible only over small units and in very rugged terrain the task unit must be even smaller. Therefore greater responsibility is place on leaders of lower rank.
The focal points of mountain combat are the heights. Gun emplacements and observation posts on commanding heights dominate foreground and valley, making the task of the advancing force on the flat easier. But of all mountain operations, the seizure of heights is most difficult. A well-defended height must be taken by surprise to avoid great losses.
Basic characteristics of mountain warfare stressed in training:
1) Movement is much slower than in the flat. Deployment requires more time. The attack proceeds slowly. The large number of good defensive positions and scarcity of roads facilitate delaying actions. Reserves have to be held very close to the front lines to prevent unforseen terrain and weather conditions from delaying their arrival at a crucial phase of battle.
2) Command and control must stay close to the decisive point. Signal communication is less reliable than in the flat. Control of the battle by the higher commander is limited largely to a pre-conceived and thorough plan, since the poor reliability of communication usually prevents him from intervening effectively once the battle has begun. Consequently the responsibility of subordinate commanders for independent action is greater than in the flat. Rarely can they expect aid from reserves.
3) The problem of supply becomes extremely acute. Motor transport must be used as far as possible into the heights, then carried on mules and mountain horses, and finally on the backs of the soldiers. Economy of supplies is necessary because the danger of extending a unit beyond its supply column is great and an over-extended unit cannot live off the country in the mountains."